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ADOPTION OF THE BA YH-DOLE ACT IN
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: ADDED PRESSURE FOR
A BROAD RESEARCH EXEMPTION IN THE UNITED
STATES?
Michael S. Mireles·

I.

INTRODUCTION

Numerous developed countries, most if not all members of the Organisation of
Economic Cooperation and Development ( OECD), including Japan, France, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Finland, have
or are considering adopting legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act. 1 These countries
apparently believe that passage of legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act will lead
to the transfer of government funded research results from the university laboratory to
the marketplace and other economic activity. In the United States, the birthplace of the
Bayh-Dole Act (the Act), it is not entirely clear whether its passage is the direct result
or sole cause of the increase in patenting and licensing occurring after its passage.
Much of this university patenting and licensing has been in the biotechnology field.
Some commentators believe that the purported positive consequence of the
Act-increased patenting and licensing-would have occurred without the Act. While
it is not entirely clear whether increased university patenting and licensing would have
happened anyway, the Act does attempt to encourage technology transfer through
several means. First, the Act provides an incentive structure to encourage participants
their employers, and potential
in the technology transfer process-researchers,
attempt to bring technology to market. The primary incentive to
licensees-to
commercialize an invention is the ability of recipients of government funding for
research to take title to patentable inventions resulting from that research. The
exclusive rights provided by the patent allow the owner or licensor of that patent to
possibly extract a supra-competitive price for the patented invention in the market.
Second, the Act also provides a uniform government policy concerning the treatment
of government funded inventions, which reduces transaction costs in obtaining
ownership to government funded inventions. Third, the Act provides a strong signal
to universities to patent and license government funded inventions. Finally, the Act
places patenting costs with the entity in the best position to bear those costs-the
university or private company-instead of the inventor.

• Assistant Professor, Sturm College of Law, University of Denver. The author would like to thank
Christine Galbraith for her kind invitation to participate in the University of Maine's Closing in on Open
Science Symposium. The author is also grateful for the support of the editorial staff of the University of
Maine Law Review, especially Heather Sanborn. The author greatly appreciates the research assistance of
Diane Burkhardt, Caryl Shipley, Ryan Fletcher, Evan Aspinwall, Dan Christopherson, and Mia Felder.
I. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of I 980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94
Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (2000)).
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Some critics of the Act argue that it upsets the production and dissemination of
scientific knowledge, particularly basic science, by the academic enterprise. Instead
of academia serving as an independent arbiter of science, governed by Merton's norms
and thus encouraged to spread knowledge widely for the public benefit, the Act has
resulted in a divergence of research agendas from basic to applied science, conflicts
of interest, increased secrecy amongst academic researchers, and a withholding of
research materials or data. The Act is also criticized for requiring the public to pay
twice for an invention: once by funding the invention through taxes, and again, by
extracting a supra-competitive price in the market through patents. Also, the Act
arguably reduces the amount of information directed to the public domain-the
foundation of new innovation-and the consequential spillover ofbenefits by allowing
the patenting of government funded inventions. Perhaps the most frequently raised
criticism of the Act is that it is contributing to the development of a tragedy of the
anti commons in biotechnology innovation. A tragedy of the anti commons occurs when
too many property rights are granted in one particular piece of property, with the result
that the holders of the rights are unable to transfer and aggregate those rights to use the
property.
There is currently conflicting empirical evidence on whether an
anticommons has emerged in the biotechnology field in the United States.
This essay makes several points. First, the Bayh-Dole Act may not be successful
in Europe and Japan-success judged by increased patenting and licensing-because
of the differences in the history, practice, and structure of most European and Japanese
university systems compared with the U.S. university system. It may take substantial
change in the practice and structure of European and Japanese university systems for
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act to be successful. While European and
Japanese university systems appear to be undergoing that change, it will likely take a
substantial amount of time to modify long-standing practices and existing structure.
Second, assuming legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act is successful in Europe
and Japan, it may make the development of an anti commons more likely in the United
States because of increased patenting and licensing by European and Japanese research
universities and spin-off companies in the biotechnology field in the United States.
Finally, while an anticommons may be avoided in European countries and Japan, as
those countries generally have a more robust research exemption to patent
infringement, the increased patenting and licensing in the United States may result in
an anti commons because of the limited common law research exemption. This may
result in pressure for the United States to enact or develop, through the common law,
a more robust exception similar to that of other developed countries.
Part II of this essay discusses the Bayh-Dole Act. Part III analyzes the adoption
oflegislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act in European countries and Japan. Part IV
reviews the anticommons theory as applied to biotechnology innovation, and Part V
analyzes the pressure for a more robust experimental use exception in the United
States. The last section offers some concluding thoughts.
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ACT

The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act represented a change in federal policy
concerning the ownership of government funded patentable inventions. 2 Prior to
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, each federal agency and funding group had its
own policy concerning whether a funding recipient could take title to an invention
developed from that funding. 3 Generally, the policies of those funding groups either
required the government to retain title or dedicate the results of federally funded
research to the public domain. Instead of favoring ownership in the government or
dedication of the invention to the public domain, the Bayh-Dole Act creates a uniform
federal policy that favors the patenting of government funded invention and the
ownership of those inventions by the recipient of federal funding. The grant of title
purportedly provides the recipient with the necessary incentive to invest in the
commercialization of the invention.
There are numerous arguments and supposed benefits of the Bayh-Dole Act;
however, there are also a number of criticisms. 4 The primary argument in support of

2. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (l 996). ALINE C. FLOWER,
TRANSFER12 (BNA 2006) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 20l(b)) (''The
PROPERTYTECHNOLOGY
INTELLECTUAL
Bayh-Dole Act generally applies to all 'funding agreements,' which are defined as government contracts,
grants, and cooperative agreements ... 'for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research
work."'). Further,
[t]he Act applies to "subject inventions," which are broadly defined as "any invention of the
contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under
a funding agreement .... " The term "invention" is further defined as "any invention or
discovery which is or may be patentable or otherwise protectable under" federal patent law.
Thus, the Act applies to invention and discoveries that can be patented, even if the
contractor is not inclined to apply for a patent.
Id. at 15 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 20l(e)). The scope of the Act is thus quite broad. For example, "[a]n
invention can be a 'subject invention' if the government spends little on its conception while the contractor
pays entirely for its further development, including its reduction to practice" and "an invention can be a
'subject invention' when conceived by a contractor working with its own funds, but reduced to practice
under a government funding agreement." Id. at 16. Thus, "the making of a simple note in a laboratory
notebook while working under a funding agreement could be considered the conception ofan invention to
which the government would have rights, even if the invention was not further researched or developed
during the term of the agreement." Id.
3. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1663.
4. The eight purposes of the Bayh-Dole Act are expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 200:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to [ l] promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development; [2] to
encourage maximum participation of small business firms in federally supported research
and development efforts; [3] to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and
nonprofit organizations, including universities; [4] to ensure that inventions made by
nonprofit organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; [5]
to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions made in the United
States by United States industry and labor; [6] to ensure that the Government obtains
sufficient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and
[7] protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and [8] to minimize
the costs of administering policies in this area.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). Recipients of federal funding who may receive ownership of the federally funded
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the Bayh-Dole Act is that private industry requires patents on government funded
inventions to justify the expenditure of resources to develop such an invention into a
commercial application. 5 Before enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, a substantial
amount of research results funded by the federal government and subsequently
patented were not licensed. 6 However, this group of patents covering government
funded research results was subject to a selection bias. 7 Most of these patents covered
inventions wherein the contractors were usually permitted to take title to those patents. 8
Thus, this group of patents had been rejected by private industry, and it should
therefore not be surprising that other industry participants would also not want to
obtain title to those patents. 9
Another justification for the Act was a belief that companies based outside of the
United States were benefiting from the results of the research funded by the U.S.
government. 10 Policy makers also believed that the Bayh-Dole Act would
"reinvigorate U.S. industry by giving it a fresh infusion of new ideas that would
enhance productivity and create new jobs."" One of the benefits of the Act was the
creation of a uniform policy concerning ownership of government funded inventions,

invention include small businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities. See The University
and Small Business Patent Procedures Act: Hearings on S. 414 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. I (I 979) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); id. at 30 (statement of Sen. Robert Dole); id. at 33
(statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). See also Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 8-12 (discussing legislative history
of Bayh-Dole Act); Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded
Inventions under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN.J. L. Sci. & TECH.393, 447-48 (2006)(discussing legislative
history ofBayh-Dole Act). The Bayh-Dole Act also specifies the conditions under which federal agencies
may apply for, obtain, and maintain patents, and license government funded innovation. 35 U.S.C. §§ 20709.
See also UNIVERSITYTECHNOLOGYTRANSFER: QUESTIONS ANO ANSWERS, COUNCIL ON
RELATIONS,]available
GoVERNMENT
ALRELATIONSI ( 1996), [hereinafter COUNCILONGoVERNMENTAL
on
at http:/1206.151.87 .67/docs/bayhdoleqa.htrn ("Enactment of Bayh-Dole Act (P.L. 96-517) ...
December 12, 1980, created a uniform patent policy among the many federal agencies that fund research.
Bayh-Dole enables small businesses and nonprofit organizations, including universities, to retain title to
materials and products they invent under federal funding."). By executive order and later congressional
housekeeping legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act was extended to not only small businesses, but to all
government contractors, including large businesses. See Exec. Order No. 12,591, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,414 (Apr.
10, 1987).
5. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1669-70.
6. COUNCILONGoVERNMENT
ALRELATIONS,supra note 4, at I. The motivation for passing the bill
was stated as follows:
One major impetus for the bill was the lack of a capability on the part of the federal
government to transfer technologies for which it had assumed ownership. Hundreds of
valuable patents were sitting unused on the shelfbecause the Government, which sponsored
the research that led to the discovery, lacked the resources and links with industry needed
for development and marketing of the inventions. Yet the government was unwilling to
grant licenses to the private sector. The few federal agencies that could grant patent title to
universities, were overregulated with conflicting licensing and patenting policies.
Technology transfer under those conditions was operationally prohibitive for universities
and made them reluctant to enter the technology area.
Id.
7. Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1702.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1703.
10. Id. at 1665.
11. Id. at 1664-65.
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which simplified the technology transfer process. Another related benefit is that the
Act cleared bureaucratic hurdles that existed prior to passage of the Act. Notably, the
discussion concerning passage of the Bayh-Dole Act was silent regarding the impact
of the Act on university contribution to innovation through academic presentations,
academic publications, and the training of future industry workers. 12
In achieving the broad purposes of commercialization and technology transfer
from the laboratory to the market through the grant of title, the Act provides incentives
to the parties involved in bringing technology to market. Those parties include the
government, the public, the inventor of the technology, the employer of the inventor,
follow-on innovators, and entities involved in the commercialization of the invention.
Instead of providing ownership initially to the inventor, the Act provides ownership to
the entity that is most likely to be able to bear the costs of patent prosecution: the
university or other grant recipient. The transfer of technology often occurs between
universities, recipients of government funding, and private industry.
Since the passage of the Act, there has been a dramatic increase in the patenting
and licensing of government funded inventions by universities or other nonprofits, and
the creation of other apparently related economic activity. 13 In 1980, fewer than 250
patents were issued to universities; in 2004, over 3,800 U.S. patents were issued to
universities. 14 More than 3, I 00 new products have been brought to market based on
university or nonprofit research since 1998. 15 Further, more than 4,500 companies
have been created based on licenses from universities and nonprofits since passage of
the Bayh-Dole Act, 16 and close to 200,000 U.S. residents are employed in the
biotechnology field. 17 Also, "[b]etween 1991 and 1999, annual invention disclosures
by university researchers increased 63% ... , patent filings increased 77% ... and new
licenses/options increased 129%." 18
Some commentators argue that the increase in patenting and licensing attributed
to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act would have occurred regardless. 19 These
commentators point to an upswing in patenting by universities prior to the passage of

12. David C. Mowery & Shaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and University-Industry
Technology Transfer: A Mode/for Other OECD Governments?, 30 J. TECH.TRANSFER115, 119 (2005).
13. See AsSOClATIONOFUNNERSITYTECHNOLOGY
MANAGERS,
AUTM U.S. LICENSING
SURVEY:FY
2004, at 2-3, available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf.
14. Id. at i.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF COMMERCE,THE ADVANCEDTECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM:REFORMWITHA
PURPOSE11 (2002), available at http://www.atp.nist.gov/secy_rept/contents.htm.
19. DAVIDC. MOWERY,RICHARDR. NELSON,BHAVENN. SAMPAT& ARVIDSA. ZIEDONIS,IVORY
TOWERANDINDUSTRIAL
INNOVATION:
UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFERBEFOREAND
AFTERTHE BAYH-DOLEACT I (2004). See also Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University
Licensing
under Bayh-Dole:
What are the Issues and Evidence,?
8 (2003),
http://opensource.mit.edu/papersffhursby.pdf. ("Does university licensing under Bayh-Dole satisfy the
Act's intent? While it is unclear what might have transpired in the absence of the Bayh-Dole Act, it is clear
that the Act has at least facilitated technology transfer from universities."); cf Rebecca Henderson, Adam
B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Universities as a Source of Commercial Technology: A Detailed Analysis
of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 REV.OFECON.&STAT. 119, 126 (1998)("Clearly, the Bayh-Dole
Act has been a success with respect to the second of these incentive effects. Both the rate of patenting and
the extent oflicensing have increased dramatically.").
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the Act because of advances in life sciences research, the change in the legal treatment
of the patentability ofliving organisms in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty2° decision, and
the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 21 The commentators
further argue that, "[ c]urrent research thus provides mixed support at best for a central
assumption of the Bayh-Dole Act, i.e., the argument that patenting and licensing are
necessary for the transfer and commercial development of university inventions." 22
Moreover, the Act is subject to criticism by many commentators because it arguably
causes a shift in the research agendas of scientists from basic to applied science,
requires the public to pay twice for an invention, contributes to the development of an
anticommons, results in increased withholding ofresearch materials and results, adds
to increased conflicts of interest among academic researchers, and the provisions
designed to protect the interests of the public have not been exercised as perhaps
expected. 23

III.

COPYING THE

BAYH-DOLE

ACT

INDEVELOPED

COUNTRIES

The purported success of the Bayh-Dole Act-an increase in patenting and
licensing activity by universities along with other economic effects-has led other
countries to adopt or consider adopting legislative schemes similar to the Bayh-Dole
Act. 24 Some of these countries are members of the Organisation of Economic
Cooperation Development. 25 For example, Japan, France, the United Kingdom,
Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Finland have adopted or
are considering enacting legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act. 26 However, there
is a substantial question as to whether similar legislation will have the same impact in
the OECD countries as the Act arguably has had in the United States: increased
patenting and licensing leading to increased economic benefits such as new companies
and jobs.
In a recent article, Professors David Mowery and Bhaven Sampat argued that
"efforts at 'emulation' of the Bayh-Dole policy elsewhere in the OECD are likely to
have modest success at best without greater attention to the underlying structural
differences among the higher education systems of these nations." 27 In the United
States, before passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, there was a history of collaboration

20.
21.
22.
23.

447 U.S. 303 (1980).
MOWERYETAL., supra note 19, at 2.
Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 122.
See, e.g., Michael S. Mireles, States as Innovation Systems Laboratories: California, Patents, and
Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZOL. REV. I 133 (2006).
24. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 115.
25. Ken Howard, Global Biotech Expansion Taking Cues from Bayh-Dole, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY
919 (2004).
26. Id. Australia is another country examining its innovation policy. See ADVISORYCOUNCILON
INTELLECTUALPROPERTY, PATENTS AND EXPERIMENTALUSE lsSUES PAPER, at i (Feb. 2004),
http://www.acip.gov.au/library/patentsexpuse.PDF
[hereinafter PATENTSANDEXPERIMENTAL
USEISSUES
PAPER]. This paper points out that "Australia spends, through public and private sources, considerable
funds on research and development, including bio-medical research. There has also been increasing
concern that there has been insufficient return on this investment through commercialization of research
and development in Australia and that inadequate use of the patent system may play a part in this." Id.
27. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 116.
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between universities and industry, including technology transfer. 28 The historical link
between universities and industry in Europe has been more attenuated than in the
United States. 29 Moreover, the structure and scale of the U.S. university system is very
different from that of most OECD countries and these different characteristics
encouraged university and industry collaboration. 3° For example, the U.S. university
system is very large, includes "a very heterogeneous collection of institutions, ...
lack[ s] any centralized national administrative control, and encourage[ s] considerable
interinstitutional competition for students, faculty, resources, and prestige." 31 Before
the Bayh-Dole Act, U.S. universities were reliant on local sources for political and
financial support, which led to increased collaboration between researchers and
industry. 32 Further, U.S. universities increased their patenting and some universities
created technology transfer offices or hired technology transfer officers during the
1970s, prior to the passage of the Act. 33
Professor Mowery has also argued that there must exist "a demand for industry for
transfer as well as the processes to facilitate the transfer." 34 He and other
commentators argue that a combination of features in the United States enable the
transfer to happen, including: "venture capital, labor mobility between university and
industry, large scale public funding for biomedical research, competition between
universities for faculty and research money, lack of central government control and
administrative autonomy of universities in addition to a comprehensive patent
system." 35 Professors Mowery and Sampat have discussed the differences between the
approaches of several countries in adopting parts of the Bayh-Dole Act. 36 For

28. Id.
29. Yannis Caloghirou, Aggelos Tsakanikas & Nicholas S. Vonortas, University-Industry Cooperation
in the Context of the European Framework Programmes, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER153, 153 (2001).
30. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 116.
31. Id. at 118.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 119.
34. Howard, supra note 25, at 919.
35. Id. at 920. Some authors have also specifically discussed the various differences between the U.S.
and Japanese systems concerning "higher education and research funding, the venture-capital and IPO
markets, cultural characteristics and incentive systems which impact scientists' entrepreneurialism, and tortliability exposures." See Michael R. Darby & Lynne G. Zucker, Star Scientists, Institutions, and the Entry
of Japanese Biotechnology Enterprises (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5795, J996).
An issue concerning the differences between U.S., European, and Japanese markets may be "that Japanese
pharmaceutical companies tend to do more in-house basic research and to a lesser extent rely on alliances
with biotechnology companies or universities" than their European and U.S. counterparts. ANNA S.
NILSSON,HENRIKFRIDEN & SYLVIASCHWAAGSERGER,SWEDISHINST. FOR GROWTHPOLICYSTUDIES,
COMMERCIALIZATION
OF LIFE-SCIENCERESEARCHATUNIVERSITIESIN THEUNITEDSTATES,JAPAN,AND
CHINA27 (2006), http://www.itps.se/ Archive/Documents/Swedish/ Publikationer/Rapporter/ Allm%C3%
A4nna/A2006/A2006_006%20webb.pdf.
This may be because of "organizational and operational
structures within companies [and] restructuring of domestic pharmaceutical companies may lead to more
interaction with universities." Id. Another commentator raises issues concerning whether European
researchers are more risk adverse than U.S. researchers in commercializing their inventions because of the
small number of positions in European universities, and whether there is a greater incentive in the United
States to commercialize certain inventions because of the lack of price controls on prescription drugs than
in many European countries where those price controls exist. Thomas J. Siepmann, The Global
Exportation of the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act, 30 U. DAYTONL. REV. 209,218 (2004).
36. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123. Universities in Europe may be more involved in
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example, some countries have allowed public research institutions such as universities
37
This is
to take title to government funded inventions instead of the inventors.
different from the U.S. experience with the Bayh-Dole Act, which moved the ability
38
to take title from the government to universities, not from inventors to universities.
The granting of title to universities creates an obligation to disclose potentially
patentable inventions to the university, allowing them the decision to patent and, more
importantly, provides title to an entity with the motivation and ability to pay patent
prosecution costs. The individual university inventor is unlikely to have the ability to
front substantial patent prosecution costs. Professor Mowery and others have argued,
however, that much of the effect of the Bayh-Dole Act, such as patenting and licensing,
would have occurred without its passage. 39
Professors Mowery and Sampat qualify their argument by stating that there may
be some "modest success at best. " 40 This "modest success" may be increased patenting
and licensing activity by universities. Moreover, the authors state that there must be
more attention to the underlying university structural differences between the United
States and other OECD countries. 41 Members of the European Union and Japan have
reformed or are currently reforming their university educational system and in some
ways the reform appears to attempt to emulate the U.S. university system. For
example, in Japan, the national universities, which received over three quarters of
funding for basic research in Japan, have been converted into an independent
42
administrative entity, called national university corporations. Apparently, most of the
results ofresearch at the national universities prior to the change to national university
corporations could be used by private firms "for free or a small amount of donation
paid to individual researchers for their inventions." 43 University corporations are now

patenting than indicated by some studies. See Bart Verspagen, University Research, Intellectual Property
Rights and European Innovation Systems, 20 J. ECON. SURV.607, 628 (2006) ("[T)he data suggest that
European universities are already more heavily engaged in patenting than was believed on the basis of
official patent statistics.").
37. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123.
38. Id. For a discussion of how some OECD countries are reforming their legal treatment concerning
ANDLICENSING
PATENTING
government funded invention, see OECD, TURNINGSCIENCEINTOBUSINESS:
95-291 (2003) [hereinafter TURNINGSCIENCEINTOBUSINESS].
ATPUBLICRESEARCHORGANISATIONS
39. Howard, supra note 25, at 990.
40. Mowery & Sampat, supra note 12, at 123.
41. Id.
42. Masuyuki Nishijima, Effects of the Anticommons on R&D: The Case of University Corporation
in Japan 22-2 SETO, KANAZAWA-KU3 (2004), available at http://repec.org/esFEAM04/up.2724.
I 080643531.pdf; see also Tabata Hirokuni, The Incorporation and Economic Structural Reform of Japan's
National Universities, 8 Soc. SCI. JAPANJ. 91 (2005) (discussing the reform of national universities in
Japan by the National University Corporations Law which converts national universities into corporate
bodies); Fifth Report to Leaders on US-Japan Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy Initiative 14
("Japan is preparing to submit
(June 29, 2006), http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/report0606.pdf
legislation to the Diet in FY2007. This legislation will expand the scope of Japan's Bayh-Dole system,
making it possible for contractors to possess ownership rights to intellectual property created through
government-sponsored development of information systems, including software."); Ashley J. Stevens &
INTELL.PROP.,Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006,
John Fraser, Understanding thelmportanceofBayh-Dole, MANAGING
at 37 ("In Japan, the government is privatizing the entire university system in part because they want
Japanese universities to become economic catalysts, like their U.S. counterparts.").
43. Nishijima, supra note 42, at 3.
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allowed to earn income from the inventions their researchers develop and their funding
is no longer guaranteed. 44 Moreover, university corporations are encouraged "to obtain
patents of their inventions and engage in cooperative research activities with private
firms." 45 This change also allows the national university corporations "to claim the
rights to all inventions made by their employees. "46 The Japanese approach apparently
attempts to create incentives for university corporations to generate income from
patents.
The European Union has also been active in reforming its university system. The
European Commission recently released a report entitled, "European Universities:
Enhancing Europe's Research Base." 47 Notably, the report expressly states that
"autonomy is a good orienting principle because there is no single model for the
European University, just as there is no model for the American University [and t]he
Forum believes that Universities should be given more freedom to respond to changes
that are occurring ... .'"'8 The report includes several recommendations for European
universities, including encouraging mobility of trained people between universities and
industry; "build[ing] up concrete synergies between universities and surrounding
society (companies, chambers of commerce, public authorities, etc.);" encouraging a
"trans-disciplinary" approach to solving "scientific problems and those faced by
society;" 49 encouraging universities to ''take a leading role in regional and local
development;" and improving their ability to raise funding to carry out research. 50
These recommendations appear to orient European universities to focus on solving

44. Id; see also Flower, supra note 2, at 400 n.5 ("University researchers can now hold a concurrent
post in the private sector, because civil service regulations no longer apply to universities.").
45. Nishijima, supra note 42, at 3; see also Flower, supra note 2, at 401 ("Currently, under Japanese
Patent Law Section 35, national university corporations can acquire ownership ofall work-related employee
inventions."); Robert Kneller, University-Industry Cooperation and Technology Transfer in Japan
Compared with the United States: Another Reason for Japan's Economic Malaise?, 24 U. PA. J. lNT'L
ECON. L. 329 (2003) (discussing ownership rules concerning government funded inventions prior to
formation of national university corporations, and the changes and impact of new ownership rules).
46. NILSSONET AL., supra note 35, at 26. Japan did enact the Industrial Vitalization Law, also called
the Japanese Bayh-Dole Act, in 1999. Id. This law allowed the public research institution to own IP
resulting from some government funding. Id. it did not apply to situations involving basic funding to the
university professor and thus, in those circumstances, the university professor was entitled to retain title to
those inventions. Id. Apparently, this situation Jed to possible under-reporting of inventions because "the
researcher [had] to determine which results came from commissioned funding [under the Industrial
Vitalization Law] or ... basic funding." Id. This apparent problem has been solved for national universities
in the legislation that has created the national university corporations. Id.
47. Forum on University-based Research, European Universities: Enhancing Europe's Research Base
(European Commission 2005) [hereinafter European Universities], http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/
conferences/2004/univ/pdf/enhancing_
europeresearchbase _ en.pdf.
48. Id. at 11.
49. The report on European Universities specifically points out scientific centers it calls "transdisciplinary" in the United States at universities such as Berkeley, Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, and
Stanford. Id. at 35.
50. Id. at 12-15. Interestingly, the report on European Universities, in discussing the role ofuniversities
in the creation of knowledge, states that universities have an entrepreneurial role "as sources of spin-offs
and start-up companies .... Addressing this role is tremendously difficult, and is not solved merely by
encouraging Universities to take out patents." Id. at 24. For more information concerning the policies
and trends in the management of intellectual property generated at universities and other public research
organizations, see TuRNING SCIENCEINTOBUSINESS,supra note 38, at 3.
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more practical problems as opposed to theoretical issues. Interestingly, Germany has
recently restructured its university system to create centers of excellence somewhat
modeled after the American university system's "Ivy League." 51
In addition to changes in the structure of university systems in Europe and Japan
to resemble some characteristics of U.S. universities, the governments in Europe and
Japan have been and are continuing to encourage collaboration between universities
and industry in those countries. In 1984, the European Union established European
Framework Programmes (FWPs) that were designed to encourage collaboration in
research and development in several fields between universities, industry, and other
research institutions across Europe. 52 FWPs are the main mechanism through which
the European Union distributes research funds and are a major part of the attempt to
create a European Research Area. 53 The European Research Area is
a vision for the future ofresearch in Europe, based on an internal market for science
and technology, which seeks to foster scientific excellence, competitiveness and
innovation through the promotion of better co-operation and co-ordination between
all relevant European actors at all levels. The creation of ERA aims to ensure the free
movement of researchers, ideas and technology in Europe, to overcome the
fragmentation of European research, and at co-ordinating national and European
programmes and policies to avoid the duplication ofresources and efforts.54

According to the authors of a study concerning research joint ventures formed
pursuant to FWPs between 1983 and 1996, FWPs have been successful in developing
a closer relationship between universities and industry in Europe. 55 In fact, the authors
found that, "[u]niversities have been very active, participating in more than fifty
percent of [research joint ventures] in all but one technology areas, the highest rate
being in the area of biotechnology (92% ). " 56 The impetus for this collaboration by
industry has included "research synergies, keeping up with major technological
developments and R&D cost sharing." 57
The most recent FWP, the Seventh
Framework Programme, is designed to apply between 2007 and 2013 and has a budget
of53.2 billion euros. 58 Notably, 32.3 billion euros is allocated to "gaining leadership
in key scientific and technology areas by supporting co-operation between universities,
industry, research centres and public authorities across the EU and with the rest of the
world." 59 Another portion of that fund is devoted to increasing the mobility of
researchers between university and industry. 60

51. Charles P. Wallace, Germany's Ivy League, TIME, March 31, 2002.
52. Caloghirou et al., supra note 29, at 153-54.
53. European Commission, Sixth Framework Programme, Frequently Asked Questions 1,
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp6/pdf/faq_en.pdf (last visited April 9, 2007).
54. EurActiv.com, European Research Area-Within Reach?, http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/
european-research-area-reach/article-162032 (last visited April 9, 2007).
55. Caloghirou et al., supra note 29, at 154.
56. Id. at 159.
57. Id. at 154.
58. European
Commission,
The
Seventh
Framework
Programme
1,
http://ec.europa.eu/research/fp7/pdf/fp7-brochure _ en.pdf (last visited April 9, 2007).
59. EurActiv.com, 7th Research Framework Programme, http://www.euractiv.com/en/science/7thresearch-framework-programme-fp7/article-l l 7494.
60. European Research Area-Within Reach?, supra note 54.
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The Japanese government began to attempt to increase collaborations between
universities and industry in the early 1980s by creating collaborative research
programs, allowing universities to take on research projects using private funds, and
developing a system of collaborative research centers at national universities. 61 While
the efforts to increase collaboration did not increase patenting and licensing activity
between the late 1980s and 1995, there was more collaboration between industry and
universities during that time period. 62 For example, in 1985, there were 216
cooperative research and development projects involving 254 researchers; by 1995,
there were 1704 cooperative research and development projects with 1843
researchers. 63 The total amount funded in commissioned research and development
projects increased from 14.7 million dollars in 1985 to 150 million dollars in 1995.64
There has also been an increase in the number of Cooperative Research Centers from
three in 1985 to forty-nine in 1995.65 In addition to those reforms, "the Japanese
legislature in 1996 enacted the Science and Technology Basic Plan," which called for
an increase in the amount of government funding for research in an attempt to come
close to government funding for research in other industrialized countries. 66 The
Second Science and Technology Basic Plan, enacted in 2001, is directed to increasing
collaborations between universities, industry, and the government. 67
Governments in Europe and the Japanese government are also attempting to
encourage technology transfer and collaborations between industry and universities in
other ways. For example, in 2001, the Japanese government lifted a ceiling on the
amount of funds "that researchers at public universities are allowed to earn from
government-held patents based on their work." 68 The ceiling was 50,000 dollars and
now there is no limit. 69 The Japanese government also enacted the University
Technology Transfer Promotion Law.70 That law encourages universities to establish
technology transfer offices directed to transfer technology from universities to
industry. 71 The Japanese government also passed the Law to Strengthen Industrial
Technology Capability in 2000, which "allows university professors to consult for
private enterprises and take managerial positions with companies in which their
research is used [and makes] it possible for researchers to gain economic benefits from
such activities. " 72

61. Steven Collins & Hikoji Wakoh, Universities and Technology Transfer in Japan: Recent Reforms
in Historical Perspective, 25 J. TECH.TRANSFER213, 216-17 (2000).
62. Id. at 217-18. However, patent applications in Japan by National Universities have risen from
below 100 in 1995 to over 350 in 1999. See David Cyranoski, Japan's Academics Get Green Light to
Make Their Fortunes, 410 NATURE 504 (2001).
63. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 216.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 219.
67. NILSSONET AL.,supra note 35, at 25.
68. Cyranoski, supra note 62, at 504.
69. Id.
70. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 219.
71. Id.
72. NILSSONET AL., supra note 35, at 26.
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In 200 I, the Japanese government initiated the Knowledge Cluster Initiative as
part of the Second Science and Technology Basic Plan and the Industrial Cluster
Program. 73 Both programs have as part of their objective the development of regional
technology systems. 74 The Knowledge Cluster Initiative is tasked with, among other
things, "conducting joint research among universities, public research institutes and
companies mainly at universities, [and] patenting and developing research results
towards commercial use .... " 75 The Industrial Cluster Initiative is designed, in part,
76
to provide "policy support for forming industry-academic-government networks. "
In 2001, the Japanese government "set the goal of doubling the number of universitybased companies to 1,000 in the next three years." 77 In 2004, the government
announced that the "number had hit 1,000" and the government will spend 480 million
dollars funding start-ups. 78 However, despite the large numbers of start-ups, those
start-ups may have difficulty surviving because the Japanese venture capital market
(1.6 billion) is substantially smaller than the United States (22 billion) or European
market (13 billion). 79 Further, in Europe, at least one country is creating a government
fund similar to a private venture capital fund to provide funding for commercialization
that is apparently beyond funding for invention. 80
Not only are governments attempting to encourage industry and university
collaboration in Europe and Japan, but some universities are actively engaging in
technology transfer and establishing contacts with industry and, importantly either
taking an active role in early stage financing or engaging venture capital funds. For
example, at least one major research institution in the United Kingdom, the Imperial
College of Science, Technology, and Medicine (Imperial College) has been focused
on technology transfer for almost twenty years. 81 In 1986, Imperial College formed
Imperial Innovations Group P.L.C., which is a technology transfer company with the
purpose of evaluating and licensing research results. As of April 20, 2006, "Imperial
Innovations had equity holdings in 58 spin-out companies and has concluded over 100
82
intellectual property agreements arising from the College's research activity."

73. Masayuki Kondo, Regional Innovation Policy and Venturing Clusters in Japan, 14 ASIANJ. TECH.
2, 170-72 (2006).
INNOVATION
74. Id. at 171-72.
15. Id. at 171.
16. Id. at 172. Kondo notes that there have been some problems with a low level of entrepreneurial
activity by start-up companies in Japan and recommends the creation of''venture clusters" that "focus[] on
the functions to create or assist creating start-ups." Id.
77. Ichiko Fuyuno, Japanese Spin-offs Face Struggle for Survival, 441 NATURE280 (2006).
78. Id.
19. Id.
80. See Stevens & Fraser, supra note 42, at 37.
http://www.
History,
Innovations
Imperial
London,
College,
Imperial
81. See
imperialinnovations.co.uk/index.php?option=com _ content&task=view&id =30&grp=4&1temid=4 i (last
visited April 9, 2007); see also P. O'Brien, William A. Wakeham & J.T. Walsh, University-Industry
TRENDSIN THE
Strategic Alliance: A British Perspective, in RESEARCHTEAMSAND PARTNERSHIPS:
http://books.nap.edu/
al
available
(1999),
32
WORKSHOP
A
OF
REPORT
CHEMICALSCIENCES,
openbook.php?record _ id=97 59&page=28 ( discussing function of Imperial Innovations).
82. See Imperial College, London, Technology Transfer Company Established by Imperial College
London lo Float on the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock Exchange (2006),
http://www.imperial.ac.uk/P7996.htm.
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Interestingly, in July of 2006, Imperial Innovations raised 26 million pounds through
offering shares on the London Stock Exchange, the first IPO of a "majority owned
university technology transfer company in the UK." 83 Those funds will be used for
continued investment in spin-off companies and technology transfer. 84 Imperial
College also started IC Consultants in 1990, a consulting company consisting of
academic staff that "markets the use of the college's scientific research facilities for use
by industrial partners .... " 85 Imperial College also makes use of strategic alliances
with industrial partners. 86 The strategic alliance includes a long term relationship
between the university and an industrial partner. 87 An example includes the research
center completely funded by Srnithkline Beecham and Zeneca. 88 Another example of
a university with a well-developed plan to commercialize university research is the
University of Manchester. The University of Manchester built a biotechnology
incubator building in 1999 that leases space to spin-off companies and has created a
wholly owned subsidiary to manage that space, called The University of Manchester
Incubator Company Limited. 89 The University of Manchester has also formed the
University ofManchester Intellectual Property Limited to direct the commercialization
of intellectual property managed and/or created by the university 90 and the Manchester
Technology Fund which provides early stage equity funding for new spin-off
companies. 91
In Japan, Tokyo University researchers funded the Advanced Science and
Technology Enterprise Corporation in 2001, which is an early-stage venture capital
fund. 92 Hokkaido University has also developed a hybrid technology transfer and
venture capital fund business that is designed to aid and form businesses built around
the results of university research. 93 Interestingly, in a 2001 study, 59.3 percent of241
researchers in Hokkaido responded to a questionnaire indicating that they were
interested in starting up a company. 94 Tsukuba University has also formed the Tsukuba
Advanced Research Alliance that is tasked with managing patents and licensing and

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Imperial College, London, Imperial College Consultants: About Us, http://www.imperialconsultants.co.uk/page.php?id=2 (last visited April 9, 2007); O'Brien et al., supra note 81, at 32.
86. O'Brien et al., supra note 81, at 33.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. University of Manchester Incubator Company, Manchester Incubator Building,
http://www.umic.co.uk/manchester _technology_quarter/Manchester_ Incubator_ Building.php (last visited
April 9, 2007).
90. University of Manchester, University of Manchester Intellectual Property Limited: About Us,
http://www.umip.com/about (last visited April 9, 2007).
91. Manchester Technology Fund, Manchester Technology Fund, http://www.mantechfund.com (last
visited April 9, 2007).
92. See Cyranoski, supra note 62, at 504; ASTEC, About ASTEC, http://www.ut-astec.com/
en_ about.html (last visited April 9, 2007).
93. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 220.
94. Kondo, supra note 73, at 176. Notably, Kondo states that "new start-ups including university startups are supported mentally by local communities [because] Hokkaido is the land of frontier spirit and
openness to newcomers" and the author compares it to California. Id. at 178.
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will "stay with funded companies until they go public." 95 Since 1992, the largest
number of spin-off companies from universities in Japan have been life sciences
companies. 96
As discussed above, the differences in the structures of the European and Japanese
university systems, among other factors, 97 make it unclear whether legislation similar
to the Bayh-Dole Act would have an impact like that in the United States-increased
patenting and licensing and other economic impact-in other developed countries that
adopt similar provisions. However, some developed countries in Europe and Japan
appear to be very focused on encouraging technology transfer and the economic
benefits that apparently flow from the transfer of technology from universities to
industry. The success of those countries in achieving the supposed benefits of the
Bayh-Dole Act remains to be seen. 98
IV.

DEVELOPMENT

OF AN ANTICOMMONS

IN THE UNITED ST A TES

The tragedy of the anti commons theory asserts that if multiple patent rights are
granted in a potential commercial application then those rights may block one another
and then no one will have an effective right to use the commercial application or
property. 99 Parties may transfer rights to overcome the anticommons, but they might
be unable to ifthere are transaction costs, strategic behaviors, and cognitive biases that
impede transfer. 100 This theory has been applied to biotechnology innovation and
usually explains a problem where there are fragmented rights that need to be
aggregated in order to use a particular commercial application. 101

95. Collins & Wakoh, supra note 61, at 220.
96. Kondo, supra note 73, at 175.
97. The existence of venture capital and its availability at early stages in the development ofa start-up
company in the biotechnology field is likely an important part of the success of the biotechnology industry
in the United States. See Brigitte Haar, Venture Capital Funding/or Biotechnological Companies in an
Integrated Financial Services Market: Regulatory Diversity within the E.C., 2 EUR. Bus. ORO. L. 585,587
(2001 ). As previously discussed, some universities and funds exist in Europe, but according to a CEO of
a biopharmaceutical company,
the availability of venture capital, combined with the willingness of Wall Street to support
companies with initial public offerings ... has put the United States as much as five to ten
years ahead of Europe and Japan in developing a biotechnology industry. Either venture
capital was not available in those areas, or the ability to cash out as a venture capitalist into
a public market was much more difficult.
Id.
98. How to avoid the potential negative impacts oflegislation similar the Bayh-Dole Act in OECD and
developing countries will be discussed in another article.
99. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE698 (1998); but see Richard A Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There
a Biomedical Anticommons?, REGULATION,Summer 2004 (criticizing the anticommons theory as applied
to biotechnology innovation).
100. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 698.
101. Id. at 698; but see David E. Adelman, The Irrationality o/Speculative Gene Patents, in ADVANCES
IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP,INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: UNIVERSITY
ENTREPRENEURSHIP
ANDTECHNOLOGYTRANSFER123 (Gary D. Libecap ed., JAi Press 2005) ("Once the
premise of a finite, congested commons is abandoned, the potential for patent anti commons to emerge
largely disappears and patents on most research tools pose far less of a threat than the typical public
commons model predicts."); David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotechnology Patent
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A related potential problem in biotechnology innovation and patenting involves
the granting of a patent on an upstream biotechnology finding that may be a
fundamental advance in the field and needed to conduct further research and
development for multiple purposes. 102 This particular finding may be required by many
researchers advancing different research agendas to continue their research, but may
also be needed for development along with other patented research tools to create a
particular commercial application. Evidence of the latter problem, an anticommons
resulting from the need to aggregate multiple rights to develop a single commercial
application, is conflicted. 103
There are numerous conflicting studies on whether an anticommons exists. 104 For
example, one particular influential study found that, "[n]one of [the] random sample
of academics had stopped a project due to the existence of third party patents on
research inputs" 105 while the American Association for the Advancement of Science
found that 35 percent of biotechnology researchers experienced difficulties obtaining
patented inventions necessary for their research. 106 Two recent studies also found a
statistically significant anticommons effect. 107
The adoption oflegislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act in OECD countries along
with changes in university structures may lead to increased patenting and licensing by
universities in OECD countries, 108 including the securing by those universities and
spin-off companies of patent rights in the United States. This may contribute to the
development of a biotechnology anticommons and stifle biotechnology innovation in

Policy, 20 BERKELEY
TECH.L.J. 985, 1020-30 (2005) (arguing that "the standard finite commons model
is not representative of the essentially unbounded opportunities that exist at this early stage of
development").
102. See generally JOHN P. WALSH,CHARLENE
CHO & WESLEYM. COHEN,PATENTS,MATERIAL
TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH (2005),
http://tigger.uic.edu/-jwalsh/NASReport.html.
103. See Charles McManis & Sucheol Noh, Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and
Development: The Empirical Evidence to Date (manuscript on file with author).
104. See, e.g., NAT'L INSTITUTES
OF HEALTH,REPORTOF THE NATIONALINSTITUTES
OF HEALTH
WORKING
GROUPONREsEARCH
TOOLS( 1998),http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/; NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL,REAPINGTHEBENEFITSOF GENOMIC
ANDPROTEOMIC
RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
RIGHTS,INNOVATION,
ANDPuBLICHEALTH(National Research Council 2006) [hereinafter REAPINGTHE
BENEFITS];AMERICAN
Ass'N FORTHEADVANCEMENT
OFSCIENCE,THEEFFECTSOF PATENTING
INTHE
AAAS SCIENTIFICCOMMUNITY7 (2006), http://sippi.aaas.org/survey/ AAAS_IP_ Survey_ Report. pdf
[hereinafter AAAS REPORT];Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property Rights Hinder
the Free Flow a/Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons Hypothesis 6 (2005),
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1465; Bhaven N. Sampat, Genomic Patenting by Academic Researchers:
Bad/or Science? 5-6 (2004), http://mgt.gatech.edu/news_roorn/news/2004/reer/files/sarnpat.pdf; John P.
Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patenting and Licensing on
ECONOMY285 (Wesley M. Cohen &
Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTSIN THEKNOWLEDGE-BASED
Stephen A. Merrill eds., National Research Council 2002); WALSHETAL.,supra note I 02, at 2.
105. WALSHETAL., supra note 102, at 2.
106. AAAS REPORT,supra note 104, at 2.
107. Murray & Stern, supra note 104, at 5; Sampat, supra note 104, at 26.
108. Nishijirna, supra note 42, at 3. ("The transition ofNational University to University Corporation
implies that results of basic research will suddenly change from public goods to private goods and that the
anticornmons problem will emerge in the product innovation where basic research and development ofnew
products are complementary.").
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the United States. While the causal link between the Bayh-Dole Act and increased
patenting and licensing in the United States is not certain, the Act very well may have
contributed to increased patenting and licensing. An additional group of universities
in OECD countries with the means and ability to secure patent rights in the United
States along with the creation of additional spin-off companies from those universities
may very well increase the likelihood of the development of an anti commons in the
United States. As discussed below, this is particularly troubling because of the lack
of a robust experimental use exception in the United States. Notably, in 2000, the
European Union and the United States expenditures for research at university
laboratories were almost the same. 109
As discussed above, whether the Bayh-Dole Act will be successful in some OECD
countries is an open question; however, increased patenting and licensing may result.
Moreover, the conditions that may contribute to an anticommons, e.g., heterogeneous
interests, and lack of experience in fast-paced, market-oriented bargaining, may also
be present in Europe. 110 Indeed, because of the lack of tradition in some countries of
a close connection between academic institutions and industry, there may be more
institutional resistance within European and Japanese universities to comply with
industry requests for delays in publishing materials that may disclose patentable
inventions. Negotiation over those types of provisions may result in substantial delays
and disagreements concerning the licensing of university-generated patentable
inventions, which could then result in a breakdown in the licensing of a particular
patented invention in Europe or Japan, and in the United States. However, in the
United States, industry is apparently not aggressively enforcing its patents against
universities, infringement by researchers is very difficult to detect, and researchers are
apparently ignoring patents. 111 It is unclear whether industry will continue its inaction

109. EUROPEANCOMMISSION,THE EUROPEOF KNOWLEDGE
2020: A VISIONFORUNIVERSITY-BASED
RESEARCH
ANDINNOVATION
10 (2004), http:/ /ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2004/univ/index
_ en.htm.
Interestingly, "there are differences between Europe and the US in terms of output, not so much for the
overall scientific production but for its impact. While the numbers of papers in peer-reviewed journals
originating from European laboratories is equivalent to the American production, the latter seems to have
an advantage when it comes to citation index, a crude measure of novelty and quality of the work." Id.
110. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 700 (heterogeneous interests of rights holders may contribute
to anticommons along with high transaction costs because of limited competence in fast-paced, marketoriented bargaining); see Education: Commission Launches Debate on Future of Inventions, EUROPEAN
REPORT,Feb. 8, 2003, at 471 ("In a general sense, European universities have less well developed structures
to manage research results than other research institutions. In addition, university staff are less familiar
with economic realities and with matters of intellectual property rights.").
111. Richard J. Bauer, Why Not Try the Experiment and Stop Pointing the Finger: Modern University
Research Unaffected by a Narrow Experimental Use Exception, 24 TEMP.J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL.L. 121,
135 (2005) ("Yet in practice, industry is not aggressively suing universities for patent infringement despite
both a university's greater than before vulnerability to patent infringement claims, and academic scientists'
pervasive and routine disregard for intellectual property rights. In fact, academic research using patented
research tools has mostly remained unmarred and scientific advancement even seems to be accelerating.");
Katherine Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 81, 85 (2004) ("Madey contradicted a belief widespread in the research community ... that all
nonprofit research was exempt from infringement liability."); see also Christina Weschler, The Informal
Experimental Use Exception: University Research After Madey v. Duke University, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1536 (2004) (arguing that there exists an informal experimental use exception because it is in the interest
of the patent holder to allow infringing noncommercial use).
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against university researchers for patent infringement as universities act more like
private industry in enforcing their patents. Participants in the biotechnology industry
continue to dedicate some potentially patentable inventions to the public domain,
which contributes to reducing the likelihood that an anticommons may develop. 112
Moreover, the Federal Circuit's recent cabining of the experimental use exception may
eventually result in university researchers avoiding the use of patented research tools
or following research agendas in areas in which a proliferation of patents exist. The
contribution of increased patenting and licensing in the United States by universities
and spin-off companies in OECD countries may very well contribute to the
development of an anti commons in the United States.

V. PRESSURE TO DEVELOP A ROBUST EXPERIMENTAL USE
EXCEPTION IN THE UNITED ST ATES

This Article argues that as developed countries adopt legislation similar to the
Bayh-Dole Act, increased patenting and licensing could result in both Europe and
Japan, and in the United States. Consequently, the likelihood that a tragedy of the
anticommons could develop in the United States is increased. This is particularly true
because of the very narrow common law experimental use exception in the United
States. Moreover, research and development may be pushed outside of the United
States where researchers can take advantage of a more robust exception. It is less
likely that a tragedy of the anticommons would develop in European Union countries
despite the potential increase of patenting and licensing that could result from
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act because of the broader experimental use
exception that exists in those countries. The possible development of a tragedy of the
anticommons in the United States will likely place pressure on the United States to
adopt an experimental use exception that resembles the exemption in the European
Union. 113 One of the benefits of this change is the avoidance of a tragedy of the
anti commons.
A potential solution to avoiding or mitigating the negative impact of a tragedy of
the anticommons in biotechnology innovation is to adopt a robust experimental use
exception. A robust experimental use exception to patent infringement may allow a
researcher to engage in some use of the patented invention without having to obtain a
license, thus avoiding transaction costs associated with obtaining the license and
mitigating problems with hold-ups associated with a tragedy of the anticommons.
One potential problem with adoption of a robust experimental use exception to
patent infringement is the negative effect on incentives to invent and innovate. A
robust exemption may erode the economic value of a patented product or process and
thus make it less likely that one would invest in the invention or commercialization of
that patented product or process. This is particularly troublesome for research tools
that may be the subject of research and investigation and follow-on research and

I 12. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2005).
113. This pressure could also result in changing provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act in the United States
designed to ensure access to government funded inventions, such as the exceptional circumstances
provision, the march-in provisions, or the adoption of a research exemption similar to that proposed by
Professor Gary Pulsinelli. See generally Pulsinelli, supra note 4.
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development, but are also commercial products and processes. 114 Moreover, with
especially complicated research projects, the patented tool may be just one of many
tools needed to advance a particular research agenda. In attempting to address issues
concerning research tools and the experimental use exception, many commentators
have advocated for changes to the experimental use exception, including expanding its
coverage.
There are two experimental use exceptions to patent infringement in the United
States: the common law experimental use exception and the statutory experimental use
exception.• 15 This essay will focus on the common law experimental use exception as
that exception is most likely implicated with university research. 116 The statutory
experimental use exception is directed to experimentation conducted for the purpose
ofregulatory review. 117 The common law experimental use exception was designed to
allow experimentation with a patented invention for the "sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement .... " 118 If the use of the

114. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an
Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARiz. L. REV.457,463 (2004). Dreyfuss states:
The fruits of biotechnology ... blur the core dichotomy between fundamental and end-use
work. Inventions in this field-genomics and proteomics, for example-have immediate,
commercial applications as diagnostics or treatments and thus they qualify for patent
protection. At the same time, they are of crucial importance to researchers, and as such,
they have enormous power. These "upstream" patents cover not just product markets but
also innovation markets ... , the ability to carry out fundamental research.
Id. See also David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 Hous.J. lNT'L
L. 615,618 (1994) (''The dual role of biotechnological discoveries as research tools and as commercial
products and processes, raises potentially significant issues related to whether early stage or laboratory scale
developments ... will receive broad protection or whether they will be made available for others to build
upon."); cf HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE POST-MADEY RESEARCH EXEMPTION 2 (2003),
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_ s31Publications/FileUpload 137/15 88/post-madley"/420whitepaper.pdf("Use
of a patented research tool for its intended purpose as a research tool should be carefully understood as not
coming under an experimental use exemption.").
115. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 27I(e)(I) (2001); Merck KGAA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
193 (2005); Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
116. A broad interpretation of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Integra Lifesciences
may result in application of the statutory exemption to research conducted at universities. Moreover,
university research "reasonably related" to regulatory approval may implicate the statutory exemption.
117. The statutory experimental use exempts conduct that would be infringing if conducted solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information to the Food and Drug
Administration. This exemption is particularly important to the generic pharmaceutical industry, but may
be less relevant to academic researchers than the common law experimental use exception. Other countries
have adopted similar statutory exceptions designed to enable generic pharmaceutical companies to use a
patented invention for purposes related to providing information to regulatory agencies for the marketing
of pharmaceuticals. For example, Canada has an exception that provides: "(I) Exception. It is not an
infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell the patented invention solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information required under any law of Canada,
a province or a country other than Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any
product." Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P 4, s. 55.2(1) (1985). In Europe, member countries of the European
Union are required by Directive to introduce legislation adopting an exception for patent infringement for
use of a patented invention to develop information for regulatory review. See European Union Directive,
No. 2004/27/EC, Article 10.6.
118. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F.Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). For a discussion
of the evolution of the United States experimental use exception, see Strandburg, supra note l l l, at 93-l 00.
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patented invention was for commercial use or with intent to profit, the use would not
be exempted from infringement. 119 Apparently most academic researchers believe their
use of a patented invention during research is exempt from infringement under this
exception. 120 While academic researchers may continue to believe their conduct is
exempt, it is clear that much of the use by academic researchers of patented inventions
is now not exempt from patent infringement. In a recent Federal Circuit case, Madey
v. Duke University, 121 the court determined that the experimental use exception did not
apply to research that utilized a patented invention at a university if there is a remote
commercial purpose, including a purpose consistent with a university's legitimate
business objectives. 122 The court stated that the university's legitimate business
objectives included, "educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in
[noncommercial research projects]." 123 The court strictly limited the application of the
common law experimental use exception to conduct that which is limited to or "solely
for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." 124 The
Madey court further stated that the "profit or nonprofit status of the user is not
determinative." 125 The National Research Council recently stated that after Madey
"formal research enjoys no absolute protection from infringement liability regardless
ofinstitutional venue, the purpose of the inquiry, the origin of the patented inventions,
or the use that is made ofthem." 126 One scholar has stated that the interpretation of the
experimental use doctrine is so narrow "that, for all practical purposes, the doctrine has
become a nullity." 127 Some have argued that the Madey decision will have a chilling
effect on academic research, particularly in the biotechnology field. 128

119. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F.Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813)(No. 12,391), see also Dreyfuss, supra
note 114, at 458 ("[T]o early jurists, a clear distinction could be made between using patented material to
learn about the patented invention and using patented material for business or for commerce - between
using the patent to satisfy curiosity or using it to tum a profit.").
120. REAPINGTHEBENEFITS,supra note 104, at 92.
121. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
122. Id. at 1362.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1653. Patent law scholar Harold Wegner has criticized contemporary courts for apparently
not recognizing that "philosophical" in the Nineteenth century meant "scientific," so philosophical
experiments were scientific experiments. WEGNER,supra note 114, at 3-4.
125. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362.
126. NATIONALRESEARCHCOUNCIL,AP ATENTSYSTEMFORTHE2 I STCENTURY7 (Stephen A. Merrill
et al eds., 2004), available at http://www.promotetheprogress.com/ptpfiles/patentreform/misc.NAS
report.pdf ..
127. Janice M. Mueller, The Evenescent Experimantal Use Exemption from U.S. Patent ln.fringment
Liability: Implication for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLORL. REV. 917,
918 (2004 ); see also Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Developing
Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 268 (2006) ("The Madey v. Duke University decision ... made it clear that
effectively no research exemption exists in U.S. law and thereby created a precarious legal situation for U.S.
universities.").
USE EXCEPTIONFOR NEW
128. See MINISTRYOF ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT,AN EXPERIMENTAL
ZEALAND'S PATENT LEGISLATION, AN OPTIONS PAPER 10 (2006),
available
at
http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/3 l 657/options-paper.pdf ("This decision is widely regarded as narrowing
the experimental use exception in the United States to the point where most organizations carrying out
research or experimental work involving patented inventions could find themselves liable for patent
infringement.") But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 539 U.S.
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As discussed above, several studies have been conducted to test whether an
anti commons has developed specifically with Madey in mind. 129 Those studies conflict
with one another as to whether an anticommons has developed, but warn that the
Madey decision may contribute to the development of an anticommons as patent
owners begin to enforce their patent rights against academic researchers. 130 In spite
of the inconclusive evidence, many have argued for an expanded experimental use
exception in the United States, including an exception that resembles that of other
developed countries. 131 In a recent OECD Working Paper entitled "Research Use of
Patented Knowledge: A Review," the authors caution that, "there is reasonably strong
evidence suggesting that patents may have some deleterious effects on scientific
research." 132 However, the authors also caution that there is "insufficient empirical
data at this stage to demonstrate that any particular form of the exemption will be more
effective than others in guarding against future restrictions on scientific work. " 133
Some developed countries have more robust experimental use exceptions than the
United States. 134 In some countries, an analog to the United States common law

958 (2003) (No. 02-1007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/6invit/2002l 007 .pet.ami.inv.html ("Even assuming the Federal Circuit's decision substantially limits the availability
of the experimental use defense, there are several reasons why the practical impact of that decision may not
be as great as petitioner fears .... ").
129. See generally, WALSH ET AL., supra note 102; REAPINGTHEBENEFITS,supra note 104.
130. REAPINGTHE BENEFITS,supra note 104; see also FEDERALTRADE COMMISSION,TO PROMOTE
INNov ATION:THE PROPERBALANCEOF COMPETITIONANDPATENTLAw ANDPOLICY35 (2003 ), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l 0/innovationrpt.pdf; but see AAAS REPORT,supra note I 04; Mowery &
Sampat, supra note 12; Murray & Stem, supra note 104.
131. See Dreyfuss, supra note 114, at 471. In this paper, Dreyfuss proposes the following system:
[A] university or other nonprofit research institution that wants to use patented material and
cannot obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms could use the technology
without permission ifit is willing to sign a waiver, [which] would require the institution to
promptly publish the results of work conducted with the patented technology and to refrain
from patenting discoveries made in the course of that work.
Id. See also Andrew Caruso, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's View, 14 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 215 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017 (1989); Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information
on Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483 (2006); Robert A. Migliorini, The Narrowed

Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement and Its Application to Patented Computer Software,
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF. Soc'Y 523 (2006); Janice M. Mueller, No "Dilettante Affair": Rethinking
the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV.
I (2001); Mueller,supranote 127; Parker,supranote 114; Strandburg,supranote 111. Cf JordanP. Karp,
Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, I 00 YALE L.J.
2169, 2179-2181 (1991) ("A system with a broad experimental use allowance would have a disparate
impact on less well-financed inventors whose ability to conduct R&D may be limited in the short term when
they are not able to convince possible investors of the potential commercial success of their patented
inventions."); Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination
of the "Tragedy of the Anticommons" in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORYL. J. 359,
372-74 (2004); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment, 57 HASTINGSL.J. 921, 954 (2006).
132. CHRISDENT, PAULJENSEN,SOPHIEWALLER,& BETH WEBSTER,0RG. FORECON. CO-OPERATION
RESEARCH USE OF PATENTED KNOWLEDGE: A REVIEW 45 (2006),
& DEV.,
pdf.
l 3 78/cl= 19/nw= I /rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=519pscsjvnvl.
http:/ /oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=353
133. Id.
134. See REAPINGTHEBENEFITS,supra note I 04, at 92 ("Many other nations provide somewhat broader
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research exception may be in legislation or in case law. 135 Most European Union
countries have enacted legislation implementing Article 27 of the Community Patent
Convention. 136 The Community Patent Convention provides that "[t]he rights
conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to: ...
(b) acts done for
experimental purposes relating to the subject-matter of the patented invention. " 137
This provision delineates between experimenting on a patented invention, which would
be excused and experimenting with a patented invention, which would not be
exempted. 138 Thus, the experimental use exception in those countries is not focused
on whether there is a commercial or nonprofit purpose for the research, but on the
nature of the research itself. 139 Research that may be permitted by a research

exemptions [than the United States]."); WEGNER,supra note 114, at 10-11. Wegner explains that
A liberal trend has been observed to favor a broader experimental use exception abroad. In
contrast to the American view which is tinged with whether there is a commercial taint, the
majority view around the world dismisses whether the invention was tested by a commercial
operation or for commercial purposes and, instead, focuses upon the qualitative question of
whether the use of the invention was to explore the nature of the invention itself (versus
using the invention for its intended purpose).
Id. See also Hagelin, supra note 13 I, at 521 ("Although the scope of ... foreign experimental use
exemptions varies, they all provide at a minimum for the use of patent subject matter for the purpose of
determining whether a patented invention is feasible, useful, or technically operable. Some of the foreign
experimental use exemptions are considerably broader and allow for the use of patent subject matter even
when the use is clearly commercially motivated."); ADVISORYCOUNCILON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY,
PATENTSANDEXPERIMENTAL
USE 2 (2005), http://www.acip.gov.au/reviews.htm (follow "Consideration
of patents and experimental use" hyperlink; then follow "report" hyperlink) [hereinafter PATENTSAND
EXPERIMENTAL
USE] ("[T]he law on experimental use of patented inventions differs markedly around the
world, and there is little movement to further rectify this.").
135. Some countries also have statutory experimental use exceptions similar to the United State
exception that is directed to uses related to regulatory approval. Other countries have interpreted their nonstatutory experimental use exception to apply to some uses related to regulatory approval. See, Mueller,
supra note 12 7, at 969- 7 I (examining statutory experimental use exceptions in other countries); Peter
Ruess, Accepting Exceptions?: A Comparative Approach to Experimental Use in U.S. and German Patent
Law, 10 MARQ. INTELL.PROP. L. REV. 81, 97-101 (2006) (discussing German cases applying statutory
exemption to clinical trials for regulatory review).
136. DENTET AL.,supra note 132. Japan adopted a similar experimental use exception. See Mueller,
supra note 127, at 969- 70.
137. Agreement Relating to Community Patents art. 27(b), Dec. 15, 1989, 89/695/EEC, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?=CELEX: 41989 AO695(0 I ):EN :HTML [hereinafter Community
Patent Convention]. See also DENTET AL., supra note 132, at 18 n.44 ("Although the [Community Patent
Convention] never came into force, it has had an influential role in the development of patent legislation
in the EU member states. As a result, article 27(b) has been widely implemented into the national patent
statutes of the EU member states, including those who are also OECD member countries.").
138. DENT ET AL., supra note 132, at 32. See also PATENTSAND EXPERIMENTAL
USE lsSUESPAPER,
supra note 26, at 18. This source explains
[t]he distinction [between experimenting with or on a patented invention] seems consistent
with the fundamental principles of the patent system in balancing the needs of the primary
innovator with those of secondary innovators and end-users and is closely related to the
disclosure requirements. As Eisenberg states "If the public had absolutely no right to use
the disclosure without the patent holder's consent until after the patent expired, it would
make little sense to require that the disclosure be made freely available to the public at the
outset of the patent term."
Id. (quoting Eisenberg, supra note 131, at 1022).
139. WEGNER,supra note 114, at 12. See also PATENTSANDEXPERIMENTALUSElSSUESPAPER,supra
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exemption would include use of the patented invention to improve, study, or design
around the patented invention. 140 The distinction between experimenting on and with
a patented invention does not work well with research tools. Experimentation with a
research tool uses the tool for its intended purpose-to conduct research. Allowing
experimentation with a research tool without liability would eviscerate the economic
incentive to invent those tools. Commentators have made some proposals to
specifically address research tools and those proposals should be seriously considered
because of the potential for patents on research tools to hinder follow-on research and
development. 141
Moreover, there are some difficulties associated with distinguishing between
experimentation on and with an invention and the "language may provide false comfort
to researchers, as it will ultimate[ly] be interpreted by legal experts, not
technologists. " 142 Some of the advantages of a statutory experimental use exception
include improved clarity and thus, increased efficiency, and the "encourage[ment of]
further secondary innovation by non-patent holders." 143 Another advantage includes
encouraging peer review of the patented technology. 144 Some potential general
problems with a statutory experimental use exception include a decrease in value of
patents and the belief that exemptions are limited to those described in the statute.
Thus "appropriate drafting would be crucial." 145
The existence of robust experimental use exceptions may decrease the chance for
the development of an anticommons in Europe and Japan. However, in countries
without a robust experimental use exception, such as the United States, it is more likely

note 26, at 18. The author states that
[I]n contrast to the ·recent views of the American courts (as expressed in Madey) which are
influenced by whether there is a 'commercial taint', the majority view around the world
ignores whether the invention was tested by a commercial operation or for non-commercial
purposes and, instead, focuses upon the qualitative question of whether the use of the
invention was to explore the nature of the invention itself versus using the invention for its
intended purpose. Thus the modem trend particularly in Europe is to draw a distinction
based on whether the experimentation is on the invention itself-to determine how it
operates, test it, and use it as a base to make different, improvement inventions-as opposed
to using an invention/or its intended purposes.
Id.
140. Strandburg, supra note 111, at I 00.
141. See generally, Dreyfuss, supra note 114; Strandburg, supra note 111.
142. DENTET AL., supra note 132, at 34; see also Strandburg, supra note 111, at 148-52 ("[I]t is
probably impossible to produce a bright-line rule to distinguish between the two types of
experimentation.").
AND EXPERIMENTAL
USE,supra note 134,
143. DENTETAL.,supra note 132, at 33. See also PATENTS
at 2. This source explains:
Under US case law experimental acts are only permitted if they are not in furtherance of the
alleged infringer's legitimate business. This approach has been highly controversial and is
considered by the [Advisory Council] as one best avoided because it does not appear to
follow the principles of the patent system. There is at least some degree of harmony within
Europe, where most countries have a statutory exemption that is worded very like the
following: The rights conferred by a patent shall not extend to acts done for experimental
purposes relating to the subject matter of the invention.
Id.
144. Dreyfuss, supra note 114, at 470.
145. DENTETAL.,supra note 132, at 33-34.
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that an increased number of patents and licensing as a result of the adoption of
legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act by other OECD countries may result in the
development of a tragedy of the anticommons. 146 Moreover, even ifOECD countries
adopt research exemptions in their versions of the Bayh-Dole Act or broader so-called
"march-in rights" than the U.S. version or interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act, the
benefits of those provisions may be unavailable to U.S. academic and industry
researchers. Second, the lack of a robust experimental use exception may also lead to
research and development work to be outsourced to countries with a robust
experimental use exception. 147 Consequently, the United States may be pressured to
adopt a more robust experimental use exception similar to other countries or as
proposed by commentators.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Whether legislation similar to the Bayh-Dole Act will result in increased patenting
and licensing in the near future in Europe and Japan is unclear; however, changes made
by countries in Europe and in Japan in university structure make it much more likely
that the Bayh-Dole Act may cause increased patenting and licensing, including that
activity in the United States. The pressure from increased patenting and licensing in
the United States by universities and spin-off companies in Europe and Japan may
result in the United States adopting a more robust common law experimental use
exception to avoid a potential tragedy of the anticommons.' 48

146. The existence of an experimental use exception that distinguishes between researching on and with
a patented invention will not allow the access necessary to avoid an anticommons in every situation. For
example, experimentation with research tools may be an infringement. A broader research exemption
perhaps modeled after Professor Strandburg' s proposal or Professor Dreyfuss' s proposal may alleviate some
of the concerns associated with research tools. See generally Strandburg, supra note 111; Dreyfuss, supra
note 114. The existence of a broad research exemption may negatively impact the ability of some start-up
biotechnology companies to obtain venture capital. See Mireles, supra note 23, at 1209-10.
147. See Migliorini, supra note 131, at 542 (arguing that the United States may lose parts of software
industry to foreign markets with robust experimental use exception); Mueller, supra note 127, at 919
("Without [a broader exemption], scientific research functions that require use of patented inventions are
more likely to be shifted offshore to legally hospitable forums."); see also Hagelin, supra note 131, at 522
(Research exemptions in other countries that are broader than the U.S. exemption "could result in the
migration of top researchers from the United States to other countries and deprive industry, as well as
universities, of critical human resources.").
148. Another option may include adopting a research exemption available for recipients of government
funding for use of government funded research results similar to the one proposed by Professor Pulsinelli.
See generally Pulsinelli, supra note 4.

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 282 2007

